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The meltdown in residential real-estate  prices that commenced in 2006  resulted in unprecedented mortgage 
delinquency rates. Until mid-2009, lenders and servicers pursued their own individual loss mitigation practices 
without being significantly influenced by government intervention. Using a unique dataset that precisely identifies 
loss mitigation actions, we study these methods—liquidation, repayment plans, loan modification, and refinancing—
and analyze their effectiveness. We show that the majority of delinquent mortgages do not enter any loss mitigation 
program or become a part of foreclosure proceedings within 6 months of becoming distressed. We also find that it 
takes longer to complete foreclosures over  time,  potentially due to congestion.  We  further  document large 
heterogeneity  in practices across servicers, which  is not accounted for by differences in borrower population. 
Consistent with the idea that securitization induces agency conflicts, we confirm that the likelihood of modification 
of securitized loans is up to 70% lower relative to portfolio loans. Finally, we find evidence that affordability (as 
opposed to strategic default due to negative equity) is the prime reason for redefault following modifications. While 
modification terms are more favorable for  weaker borrowers, greater reductions  in  mortgage  payments  and/or 
interest rates are associated with lower redefault rates. Our regression estimates suggest that a 1 percentage point 
decline in mortgage interest rate is associated with a nearly 4 percentage point decline in default probability. This 
finding is consistent with the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) focus on improving  mortgage 
affordability. 
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1.   Introduction 
With the recent boom and bust of the housing market and the subsequent financial crisis, 
mortgage delinquency rates have reached unprecedented levels. In an attempt to mitigate losses, 
lenders and servicers have pursued several resolution practices including liquidation, repayment 
plans, loan modifications, and refinancing.
1 Although delinquency rates increased dramatically 
as early as mid-2007, the first coordinated large-scale government effort—the “Making Home 
Affordable” program—was unveiled only in February 2009. An explicit goal of one of the key 
components of this effort—the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)—is to induce 
lenders and servicers to prefer loan modifications over liquidations.
2
In this paper, we explore the practices chosen by lenders and servicers before the HAMP 
in order to study the market-based approaches to stem mounting mortgage losses. Specifically, 
we focus on loans that became seriously delinquent in the six calendar quarters starting in Q1, 
2008. Using a unique and detailed dataset of loss mitigation practices, we attempt to understand 
the driving forces for decisions made by lenders and servicers as they responded to deteriorating 
market conditions, without the influence of government intervention. The data also allow us to 
resolve  the ongoing academic debate about the role of securitization in loan modification. 
Furthermore, the rich variation in loss mitigation policies in the pre-HAMP regime allows us to 
measure the effects of modification terms on post-modification mortgage performance.  
  
We use the OCC-OTS MortgageMetrics dataset that contains precise loss mitigation and 
performance  outcomes for  about 64% of U.S.  mortgages. The dataset is a  loan-level  panel 
comprised of monthly servicer reports of the payment history as well as detailed information 
about loss mitigation actions taken for each distressed  mortgage. By way of example, for a 
                                                           
1There exist a number of alternative policy proposals for addressing mortgage market problems. Hubbard and Mayer 
(2010) focus on household inability to refinance their mortgages which impedes their ability to continue making 
payments. They consequently propose a streamlined and concerted effort on part of the GSEs to effect refinancing 
of mortgages guaranteed by the federal government. Posner and Zingales (2009) propose a plan in which the lenders 
reduce the principal for troubled borrowers and in exchange take an equity position in the home. Foote, Fuhrer, 
Mauskopf, and Willen (2009) propose a government payment-sharing plan to help unemployed homeowners avoid 
foreclosure.  
2 Previous efforts included the voluntary Hope Now Alliance, the FHA HOPE for Homeowners program originated 
under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), the FDIC pilot program of systematic 
modification of loans held by IndyMac, which subsequently formed the basis for the agency’s “Mod in a Box” 
blueprint for modifications. 2 
 
delinquent loan undergoing modification, the dataset contains information on specific changes in 
original loan terms, reduction in interest rate, amount of principal deferred or forgiven, extension 
of the repayment period, etc. To our knowledge, this is the only comprehensive data source on 
loss mitigation efforts and mortgage performance.  
We first describe the process of loss mitigation in the context of the financial crisis and 
study the determinants of each of the resolution methods. For modified loans, we further study 
the factors influencing changes in contractual terms. Finally, we evaluate the effect of various 
modification terms on mortgage performance post-modification. 
An evaluation of the choice between different loss mitigation practices is the thrust of our 
study. We classify resolution practices into four main categories: liquidation, repayment plans, 
modification, and refinancing. Liquidation includes foreclosure, deed-in-lieu, and short sales. 
Repayment plans are short-term programs that allow borrowers to repay late mortgage payments, 
typically,  over  a  six to  twelve month  period.  In modifications,  mortgage terms are altered. 
Modification programs sometimes begin with a trial period of a few months, at the end of which, 
conditional on success, modification becomes permanent. Modifications could result in lenders 
altering the mortgage interest rate, balance, and/or term. Refinancing occurs when a new loan is 
issued in place of the existing one.
3
  We find that within six months after becoming seriously delinquent, about 31% of the 
troubled loans  that enter our sample  in 2008 are in liquidation  (either voluntary or through 
foreclosure), 2.4% enter a repayment plan, 2.2% get refinanced, and 10.4% are modified. The 
rest (about 54%) have no recorded action. The staggering amount of delinquent loans that see no 
action from lenders/investors is consistent both with the idea of an industry overwhelmed by the 
wave of problem mortgages and with the difficulty in overcoming the severe asymmetries of 
information that inhibit active loss mitigation.  
 While liquidation implies that the borrower loses his house, 
the three other resolution categories imply that the borrower can stay in the house. 
                                                           
3 Among wide-scale government initiatives, the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) initiated in March 
2009 offers refinancing of loans owned or guaranteed by the Fannie Mae or Freddie Mae. The program is limited to 
performing loans with high LTV ratios (up to 125%). More information is available at 
http://makinghomeaffordable.gov/refinance_eligibility.html. 3 
 
The distribution of loss mitigation choices and outcomes varies substantially over time. 
Approximately a third of all loans that become distressed during the first quarter of 2008 are in 
liquidation within six months of entering the sample. Half of those loans complete the liquidation 
process  within this time frame. Although the same share of 2008:Q4 distressed loans find 
themselves in liquidation, only one in eight of those loans completes the liquidation process 
within six months. This, again, is suggestive of a resolution system struggling to cope with the 
volume of troubled loans. Although modifications and other non-liquidating methods of loss 
mitigation become more prevalent over time, they remain a distant third in the set of outcomes 
for troubled loans behind the extremes of liquidations and inaction. 
A common theme in both the academic and popular press has been commenting on the 
scarcity of loan modifications relative to foreclosures in loss mitigation approaches. Much of the 
existing research has focused on the conflicts between servicers and lenders/investors to explain 
low modification rates.
4 Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) analyze transaction-level data and show 
that  portfolio loans experience lower foreclosure rates, which the authors attribute to more 
intensive renegotiation efforts on the part of portfolio lenders. Our data allow us to evaluate the 
likelihood of loan modification directly. We indeed find evidence in support of the Piskorski, 
Seru, and Vig (2010) hypothesis. In particular, we show that securitized mortgages that become 
troubled are less likely than portfolio loans to end up in modification, as opposed to other forms 
of loss mitigation. This holds true for mortgages securitized by private entities and even stronger 
for mortgages securitized through the GSEs.  The  estimated reductions in the  likelihood of 
modification relative to portfolio loans (3.1 percentage points in private-label and 6.6 percentage 
points for GSE securitizations) are economically very large, given the unconditional rates of 
these loss-mitigation practices in our sample of 9.4 percent (see Table 1, Panel A).
5
                                                           
4 Stegman, Quercia, Ratcliffe, Ding, and Davis (2007) and Gelpern and Levitin (2009) argue that securitization 
contracts are written in a way that does not allow easy modification. Stegman et al. (2007) also find large variation 
in servicer ability to cure delinquencies, implying that poor servicing quality translated into higher default rates. The 
theme of conflicting servicer and investor incentives is echoed in Eggert (2007) and Goodman (2009). Magder 
(2009) goes farthest in claiming that these conflicts of interest are the reason for low modification rates. 
 
5 A caveat to the result of low modification rate by the GSEs is that it appears that GSEs have strong preference to 
refinance their troubled mortgages rather than to modify them. We find that the likelihood of refinance is higher by 
3.5% for GSE loans, where the base probability is 1.85%. 4 
 
Another  hypothesis regarding the preference of foreclosures over modifications by 
lenders is that they may not bear the negative externalities of their actions (Adelino, Gerardi, and 
Willen 2009). The extent of such externalities is quantified by Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak 
(2010) who find direct losses of about 30% on foreclosed homes, which is in addition to negative 
spillover effects on the prices of neighboring homes. We are able to address this hypothesis by 
testing whether loss mitigation choices vary with lender exposure to the local housing markets 
(i.e., mortgage holdings in a given housing market, defined as a zip code area). In our analysis, 
we do not find evidence that lender  behavior changes when they may  be affected by this 
externality. 
Whatever the role of these explanations in explaining low modification rates, high 
redefault rates of modified loans exert a more direct influence on lender and servicer choices. We 
show that within six months of modification, redefault rates are 34% when redefault is defined as 
60+ days past due (dpd), or 22% when redefault is defined as 90+ dpd. Industry reports (OCC-
OTS 2009) document that modified loans in the recent wave of modifications exhibit extremely 
high redefault rates—close to 50% within six months of modification. Dugan (2008) reports that 
nearly 58% of loans modified in the first quarter of 2008 were again in default eight months 
later. The extremely high redefault rates in the current crisis contrast sharply with the experience 
from loan modifications in a more placid environment. For instance, loans modified between 
1995 and 2000 had redefault rates of 20% after five years according to Crews-Cutts and Merrill 
(2008). 
To understand the drivers of  high  redefault rates,  and means by which modification 
success can be improved, we analyze the determinants of redefault and the relation between 
modification terms and redefault  after controlling for a number of key borrower and loan 
characteristics.
6
                                                           
6 It is likely that modification terms and redefault are both driven by borrower characteristics that are observable to 
the servicers, but not to the econometrician. The resulting endogeneity can be ameliorated through instrumental 
variables techniques. We experimented with a number instruments based on servicer practices. The results are 
available upon request.  
  We find that redefault rate  is  higher for low documentation loans. Further, 
redefault rate declines with FICO score and increases with loan-to-value. We note, however, that 
the association of FICO with redefault is 2.5 times larger than the effect of leverage on redefault.  5 
 
Next, we analyze the determinants of modification terms and their association with post-
modification default. While we find some variation in the characteristics of borrowers at loan 
origination and at the time they enter the loss mitigation process, this variation is dwarfed by 
differences in servicer modification practices and redefault rates following modification. In fact, 
servicer fixed effects explain at least as much variation in modification terms as do borrower 
characteristics.  This strongly suggests that servicer loss mitigation choices are driven by 
institutional factors, as well as by variation in their underlying borrower populations. We also 
document that over the course of the period studied, there is some convergence in modification 
terms across servicers, which may perhaps be attributed to learning. Interestingly, concessions in 
modification terms are more generous for borrowers  with weaker characteristics  (e.g. FICO 
scores and LTV ratios) at the time of becoming delinquent. 
Furthermore, we find a strong relationship between modification terms and subsequent 
probability of redefault. In particular, greater reductions in loan interest rates (or monthly 
payments) are associated with sizable declines in redefault rates. As an illustration, a reduction of 
1% point in the interest rate is associated with a 3.9% point drop in six-month redefault rate. 
Given that modification terms are more favorable to weaker borrowers, we view this effect as a 
likely lower bound for the causal effect of affordability on the likelihood of redefault. 
Overall, our results suggest that affordability is a prime driver of redefault following 
modifications. These results provide support for the motivation behind the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP) initiated in 2009. According to Cordell, Dynan, Lehnert, Liang, 
and Mauskopf (2009), the advantages of the HAMP over foreclosures is that the program can be 
best suited for households that struggle with affordability. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data source and the 
organization of the database. Section 3 analyzes loss mitigation practices over time and across 




2.   Data 
2.1.   Data sources 
For this paper we use the OCC/OTS Mortgage Metrics dataset. This dataset includes 
origination and servicing information for large US mortgage servicers owned by large banks 
supervised by the OCC, as well as large thrifts overseen by the OTS. The data consist of monthly 
observations of over 34 million mortgages totaling $6 trillion, which make up about 64% of US 
residential mortgages. About 11% of these loans are held in portfolio—i.e., are originated by the 
servicing bank—and 89% are being serviced for other lenders. The data allow us to differentiate 
among  19  servicing entities, each of which maintains effective autonomy in making loss 
mitigation decisions, regardless of their ultimate corporate ownership. The study spans the period 
between October 2007 and May 2009. We anticipate the data reporting to continue and the 
dataset to be updated regularly.  
The origination details in the dataset are similar to those found in other loan-level data 
(e.g., First CoreLogic LoanPerformance or LPS data). The servicing information is collected 
monthly and includes details about actual payments, loan status, and changes in loan terms. 
Critically, the dataset also contains detailed information about the  workout resolution for 
borrowers that are in trouble.  For  modifications, the data  contains information about the 
modified terms and repayment behavior. The ability to observe loan status on a monthly basis 
also allows us to evaluate post-modification mortgage performance. 
It should be noted, however, that the Mortgage Metrics dataset has certain limitations. 
For instance, it lacks information on combined loan-to-value ratios (CLTV) making it difficult to 
accurately estimate distressed borrowers’ equity position. The data are not linked to outside 
sources on the rest of borrowers’ debt obligations, which masks borrowers’ true financial 
positions  when they run into mortgage trouble. Furthermore, certain data fields (e.g.,  self-
reported reasons for default) are reported by only a subset of servicers and even then do not 
appear to follow a common set of data rules.  Yet, on balance, the detail and precision of 
information on loss mitigation practices in this dataset is unique, potentially leading to a better 
understanding of an important policy question.  7 
 
2.2.  Identifying “in trouble” mortgages 
When analyzing the transaction data, we focus on troubled mortgages. The original OCC-
OTS dataset is an unbalanced panel. Thus, it contains information on 34 million mortgages per 
month. We transform this dataset into a cross-section of mortgages in two steps. First, we extract 
the subsample of loans that become troubled at any point in the sample. Troubled mortgages are 
mortgages that became 60+ days past due  since the first quarter of 2008 or entered a loss 
mitigation program in 2008 or later. To ensure that our analysis correctly captures the timing of 
loss mitigation actions, we require all mortgages in our universe to be current in the last quarter 
of 2007. Out of the 34 million monthly mortgage observations, we identify about 1.8 million 
individual mortgages which become troubled at some point between January 2008 and May 
2009. Second, we summarize the important outcomes, event dates, and characteristics for each 
mortgage  and then collapse the Panel Data into a cross-section dataset. For example, each 
observation includes its characteristics at origination, the date in which it became “in trouble”, its 
characteristics when it became “in trouble”, the first action taken by the lender and the date of 
that action, etc. 
Table 1, Panel A provides a broad summary of the sample, highlighting borrower and 
loan characteristics at different points in time. The average FICO score of troubled borrowers 
drops by 60 points between origination and the time of entry into the sample, indicating 
considerable financial stress. The loan-to-value (LTV) ratios tell a similar story of deteriorating 
financial position, although the averages mask considerable variation in home equity positions. 
In particular, a substantial fraction of mortgages originated during the boom years (2004-07) 
enter the sample with negative home equity, while many of the longer held mortgages have fairly 
low LTV values. The distribution of LTV values further suggests that a majority of troubled 
borrowers have at least some positive equity stake in their houses. Finally, as mentioned earlier, 
these figures under-represent total leverage because they often fail to capture second-lien loans 
taken on the same property.  
The sample represents all major investor/lender categories, as about a third of the loans 
are owned by the GSEs and slightly more than a quarter are securitized through private-label 
MBS. As would be expected for a sample of distressed loans, it contains a disproportionate 8 
 
number of investor properties, second-lien loans, and loans underwritten with less than full 
documentation. 
 
3.   Loss Mitigation Practices  
3.1.  Description of loss mitigation resolution types 
Loss mitigation resolutions include four major types of actions that lenders and servicers 
typically take.
7
The first class of interventions is liquidation. This includes liquidation of the property in 
agreement with the borrower through  deed-in-lieu or short sale, as well as completed 
foreclosures. Deed-in-lieu is the process in which the borrower transfers the property interest to 
the lender, and thus avoids the legal process of forced foreclosure through the courts. In a short 
sale, the lender and borrower agree to sell the property (typically at a loss) and transfer the 
proceeds to the lender who then writes off the balance of the mortgage loan. In foreclosures, the 
lender takes legal steps to pursue its interest in the property through the courts. 
  Figure 1 presents a summary  chart of different resolution types. The loss 
mitigation process begins when a borrower becomes seriously delinquent (typically 60 days past-
due) or when a borrower voluntarily contacts the lender and requests to renegotiate the loan. 
Both of these types of borrowers are considered “troubled” in our analysis. 
The second type of loss mitigation identified in the data is repayment plans. Under a 
repayment plan, delinquent borrowers commit to pay back the missing payments over several 
months (typically 3 to 6 months). Once the arrears are paid off, the lender reinstates the borrower 
status as current. In this type of intervention, the terms of the original loan are maintained. 
The next loss mitigation practice depicted in the diagram is loan modification, which 
attracted considerable publicity in discussions leading up to the eventual implementation of 
HAMP and in its aftermath. The distinguishing feature of loan modifications is the amendment 
of the original mortgage terms. The usual process has the lender independently offering the 
borrower a new set of loan terms, or negotiating new terms with the borrower. This process can 
be quite lengthy as it requires collection of relevant documentary evidence and subsequent 
                                                           
7 Crews-Cutts and Merrill (2008) provide an overview of the different types of interventions. 9 
 
negotiations. Modification may also proceed in stages, with a borrower first committing to a trial 
offer for a certain period of time. Conditional on being able to fulfill the terms of a trial contract, 
the modification offer can be made permanent. These stages are reflected in Figure 1. 
The final two resolution types presented in Figure 1 are refinancing and the catch-all 
category of “other”, less common,  workout approaches, such as  claim  advances  from  the 
mortgage insurance company. Refinancing of distressed loans is similar to usual refinancing but 
may need to be done on the basis of more forgiving underwriting criteria, such as higher-than-
typical LTV ratios. In principle, refinancing is similar to a loan modification, as it effectively 
replaces an existing contract with a new one. However, it may allow the lender greater flexibility 
in selling off the loan. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics about resolution types offered to troubled mortgages 
by vintage, i.e., the quarter in which mortgages entered the sample. The panel shows two main 
results: (i) the majority of loans in the troubled sample do not enter any loss mitigation process 
within 6 months and (ii) liquidations play by far the dominant role in observed loss mitigation 
practices.
8
For instance, among loans that enter our sample in 2008:Q1, about 15 percent find 
themselves in ongoing  foreclosure proceedings within 3 months  (Panel A). An additional 6 
percent have gotten liquidated through a formal loss mitigation process, and a similar fraction 
has been modified. Repayment plans and refinancing are very rare, accounting for less than 3 
percent of all troubled loan resolutions. More strikingly, nearly 70 percent of all loans in sample 
are not in any resolution process—liquidating or not—within the first 3 months.  
 
As the horizon for workout resolutions increases to 6 months (Panel B), the share of 
completed  liquidations through loss medication programs rises rapidly to 16 percent.  Other 
workout resolutions increase as well, with modifications reaching 9.4 percent of all loans. Yet, 
                                                           
8 Since our data only extends to May of 2009, our ability to track loan status depends on the time at which a loan 
becomes troubles. For loans that become troubled during the first or the second quarter of 2008, we observe 
resolutions over the subsequent 12-month window. However, for 2009 vintage troubled loans, only immediate 
resolutions can be recorded, Since a 6-month observation window is available for almost all loans that become 
troubled throughout 2008, we focus on this combination of troubled loan vintage and time window in our analysis.  10 
 
even six months later, more than half of all troubled loans (54 percent) are not in loss mitigation 
or foreclosure proceedings.  
Loss mitigation liquidations of the 2008:Q1 vintage loans accelerate further to 35 percent 
by the end of the 12-month window (Table 2, Panel D), and modifications rise to nearly 15 
percent. At that point, nearly three-quarters of all troubled loans are being acted upon, with the 
lion’s share of resolutions—71 percent (or .188+.348 of .75 of loans)—coming in the form of 
loan liquidations. 
A qualitatively similar picture emerges for other vintages of troubled loans.  One 
important difference, however, lies in the speed at which foreclosure proceedings become 
converted into liquidating resolutions. This  contrast  is illustrated by comparing shares of 
resolved and unresolved foreclosure proceedings over a six-month window (Table 2, Panel B) 
for loans that become troubled at the beginning and the end of 2008. Among 2008:Q1 troubled 
loans, an equal share (16 percent) get resolved through liquidation or are in the process of 
foreclosure. Among the 2008:Q4 vintage, however, 28 percent of loans are still in foreclosure 
proceedings, while only 4 percent reach a liquidating resolution. This is strongly suggestive of a 
system that has trouble resolving the flood of non-performing loans through existing loss 
mitigation channels. Each subsequent vintage brings in more troubled loan than the number that 
could be addressed in any fashion during the preceding period. The resulting build-up clogs up 
the system even further. Arguably, it may also take away resources from the more labor- and 
information-intensive loss mitigation approaches that result in keeping troubled borrowers in 
their homes, such as modifications and repayment plans. 
Turning back to borrower characteristics, the OCC/OTS Mortgage Metrics data allow us 
some limited insight into reasons for borrower default, summarized in Table 1, Panel C. The 
largest share of borrowers with a stated reason for default (about 8 percent) point is due to 
“excess debt”, likely deriving from the sharp decrease in house prices and the inability of 
borrowers to refinance their mortgages. The next largest group (about 6 percent) point attribute 
their distress to job loss. Unfortunately, very high non-response rate and the dominance of the 




3.2.  Heterogeneity across servicing entities 
While lenders/investors determine policy guidelines for loss mitigation resolution, the 
implementation and loan-level decision-making typically reside with servicers. For securitized 
mortgages, servicer activities are guided by Pooling and Service Agreements (PSAs).  For 
portfolio loans serviced in-house, servicers follow internal policies for loss mitigation. Our data 
allow us to examine loss mitigation practices pursued by each servicer. Banks reporting to the 
OCC/OTS Mortgage Metrics database may own multiple servicing entities that may specialize in 
certain loan types or channels of originations. To be more precise in our analysis, we focus on 19 
such entities, each of which exercises considerable autonomy in loss mitigation decisions, 
regardless of their ultimate corporate ownership.
9
We start with a rough summary of differences in the key underlying borrower and loan 
characteristics across servicers. Table 1, Panel D presents servicer-level means of FICO scores 
and LTV ratios at origination. Due to data confidentiality issues, servicers are presented in a 
random order and the number of loans serviced by each entity is suppressed. The panel shows 
variation across servicers. For example, mean LTVs at origination vary between 73 and 90 
percent, with lower numbers typically associated with servicers with greater share of refinancing 
transactions. Similarly, servicer-level FICO averages range between 623 and 697. Although this 
range appears low relative to the general borrower population, it is not surprising for a subset of 
loans in default, which is what is summarized in the panel. 
 Since an important part of this analysis focuses 
on loss mitigation resolutions within a six month window, we limit our attention to loans that 
become troubled during the 2008 calendar year. 
Next, we examine heterogeneity in loss mitigation practices across servicers. Table 1, 
Panel E, summarizes the distribution of servicer-level resolutions attained within six months of 
entry into the troubled loan sample. The data are also summarized in Figure 2. Again, there is 
considerable variation across servicers.  Whereas some servicers report virtually no loan 
modifications, others modify about a quarter of their troubled loans, and one servicer reports a 
staggering modification rate of close to 60 percent. A similar degree of dispersion can be 
                                                           
9 For ease of reference, “servicer entities” and “servicers” are used interchangeably from this point on. 12 
 
observed for every loss modification mode. Importantly, we also observe substantial 
heterogeneity in post-resolution redefault rates. Ignoring the zero redefault rate reported for loans 
from one of the servicing entities, the shares of loans in redefault vary between 16 and 61 percent 
for 60+ days past due loans, and between 9 and 42 percent using the more stringent definition of 
90+ days past due.  
 
3.3.  A multivariate perspective on loss mitigation choices 
To better quantify the importance of servicer-specific approaches to loss mitigation, we 
turn to a multivariate analysis, the results for which are presented in Table 3. In this analysis, we 
estimate simple OLS and probit specification for each of the resolution choices in turn.
10 These 
regressions control for observable investor and mortgage characteristics (FICO score and LTV 
ratio at the time of entering the troubled loan sample, type of lender,  etc.),  as well as 
macroeconomic characteristics (changes in county-level unemployment, change in MSA home 
prices, etc).
11,12 In each specification, the latest FICO and latest LTV scores are discretized into 
buckets to allow greater flexibility in estimation.
13 We also include year of origination dummies 
and calendar month fixed effects.
14
                                                           
10 Table 3 reports OLS estimates that are arguably more consistent in specifications with a large number of fixed 
effects. The probit estimates are qualitatively similar and are available upon request. 
 
11 Changes in home prices are taken from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). In a 
previous version of the study, we used multinomial logit that modeled the choice of lenders. While the multinomial 
logit specification models the choice more accurately, the interpretation of the coefficients was convoluted, and in 
several cases, the regression did not converge due to the fixed effects. In the cases where we had convergence, the 
coefficients were qualitatively similar. 
12  The number of observations drops in some regressions because of lack of variation in the right hand side 
variables. For example, since some lenders servicers do not modify loans at all, when we introduce their fixed 
effects , the left hand side variable (e.g., whether a loan was modified or not) has a correlation of 100% of the fixed 
effects, and the observation is dropped. 
13 The FICO buckets are: (1) 300-499, (2) 500-524, (3) 525-549, (4) 550-569, (5) 570-599, (6) 600-629, (7) 630-659, 
(8) 660-699, (9) 700-749, and (10) 750-800. The LTV buckets are: (1) <60%, (2) 60% to <70%, (3) 70% to <75%, 
(4) 75% to <80%, (5) 80% to <85%, (6) 85% to <90%, (7) 90% to <95%, (8) 95% to <100%, (9) 100% to <110%, 
and (10) 110%+. 
14 The origination year dummies are: (1) before 2002, (2) 2002, (3) 2003, (4) 2004, (5) 2005, (6) 2006, (7) 2007, (8) 
2008-2009. 13 
 
Furthermore, we add variables that capture  the  servicer entity’s  aggregate unpaid 
mortgage balance in the local housing market (zip code) and the one-month lagged share of 
modifications in the zip code for the servicer. The first of these variables is meant to control for 
spillover externalities of servicer’s actions on their outstanding loans. The second attempts to 
capture path dependence in mitigation choices. The idea there is that loan modification requires 
an upfront investment on the  part of the servicer. This information-  and resource-intensive 
process also benefits from learning-by-doing, and thus past choices of loan modifications may be 
indicative of future loss mitigation approaches. 
Each of the loss mitigation choice regressions is estimated with a number of different 
fixed effects for the owner/servicer of a loan. The first specification for each choice allows for a 
servicing entity fixed effect, while the second specification also puts in securitizer fixed effects. 
The latter delineates the identity of the securitizing entity (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, GNMA, 
private-label) or identifies a loan as being held by its originator. 
Panel A of the table presents results for the six-month likelihood of a troubled loan 
ending up in a loss mitigation process that results in the  borrower leaving the house.  For 
completeness, we show the likelihood of a completed liquidation process (Columns (3)-(4)), that 
of an initiated foreclosure proceeding (Columns (5)-(6)), as well as the joint likelihood of either 
liquidating resolution (Columns (1)-(2)). Panel B follows the same layout for resolutions that 
result in the borrower staying in their house: repayment plan, loan modifications, refinancing, as 
well as the joint likelihood of any non-liquidating resolution. 
The table presents several interesting results. First, we note that borrower and mortgage 
characteristics are important determinants of loss mitigation resolution. Troubled loans that were 
not underwritten on the basis of full documentation (low documentation and stated income loans) 
are generally less likely to receive loan modifications, and are more likely to be liquidated. The 
same applies to loans issued for non-owner-occupied properties. Investor properties, on average, 
are less likely to be a part of any loss mitigation practice that results in the borrower’s continuing 
ownership of the property. In terms of magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, second lien 
loans are the least likely to be modified, controlling for all other loan characteristics. This is 
hardly surprising, as junior liens likely suffer most severe losses in modifications.  14 
 
Macroeconomic variables also have a very strong effect on the likelihood of choosing to 
liquidate as the means of loss mitigation. We find much higher propensity to liquidate in areas 
with greater increases in the rate of unemployment. The same holds true in MSAs with lower 
cumulative price appreciation since origination (Panel A, Columns (1)-(2)).  
We estimate weak path dependence in the likelihood of modification. Columns (5)-(6) in 
Panel B show that higher past modifications marginally increase the propensity to modify loans 
in the current period. We also find that past modifications positively affect the likelihood of 
completed liquidations and negatively affect the likelihood of ongoing foreclosure proceedings. 
This is consistent with the interpretation of workout resolutions—whether through liquidation or 
modification—requiring substantial local resources on part of servicers. Locations in which 
servicers have been able to complete more modifications  are also locations that have more 
completed foreclosures or short sales and fewer unfinished foreclosure proceedings. 
Figure 3 presents a graphical summary of coefficient estimates on FICO score and LTV 
buckets. The omitted category for the FICO score at the time of trouble is group 6 (score 
between 600 and 630). The coefficients for the LTV ratio at the time of trouble are shown 
relative to group 5 (ratio values between 80 and 85). The dotted lines depict 5% confidence 
intervals. The top panel presents “stay in the house” resolutions, while the bottom panel shows 
resolutions of the “leave the house” variety. 
Turning to borrower creditworthiness (the top row of charts in Panel A), we find that 
borrowers with the highest FICO scores at the time of troubled sample entry are somewhat less 
likely to get their loans modified. This is consistent with the argument in Adelino, Gerardi, and 
Willen (2009), since such borrowers likely have the highest self-cure rates, making the servicers 
less willing to offer concessions. On the other hand, we observe that high-FICO are considerably 
more likely to be able to refinance their loans. Again, this is consistent with expectations of 
higher self-cure rates among this group of troubled borrowers. Refinancing effectively allows the 
lender/investor to “extend-and-pretend” loans with greater self-cure probabilities. This theme is 
repeated for LTV bucket coefficients. In particular, we observe much greater likelihood of 
refinancing and less likely loan modifications for troubled loans with low LTV ratios. We 
speculate that such refinancings are accompanied by equity cashouts that improve household 
ability to service the new loan without making permanent concessions inherent in modifications. 15 
 
Looking at liquidating resolutions in Panel B, we document greater likelihood of low-
FICO borrowers and high-LTV loans entering the liquidation process first. This is evidenced by 
their higher propensity to complete the liquidation process within 6 months of default. As a 
result, there are fewer high-LTV loans and low-FICO borrowers in the foreclosure queue. Loans 
with the lowest LTV ratios at time in trouble are less likely to be liquidated, although lenders 
would appear to realize lower losses on such properties.  The likelihood of being in the 
foreclosure process (the middle column) may appear to present a conflicting story. For instance, 
high FICO borrowers, have greater propensity of being in foreclosure proceedings. We believe 
that a part of this finding may be  due to automatic filing of foreclosure notices that is 
independent of borrower or property characteristics that is followed by more concerted resolution 
efforts. Such efforts would be better reflected in completed liquidations or 
modifications/refinancings, which is where we prefer to focus our attention. 
In Table 3, Panel C, we examine the determinants of loans that have no action within the 
six-month window.
15
Below  we  address specific theories concerning loan modifications  that have  been 
discussed in the literature.  
 These mortgages that owned by owner-occupiers and fully documented. 
These houses are located in areas of good employment opportunities, and high past home price 
growth. Figure 3C shows that no action takes place for borrowers in low FICO score category 
and with both extreme low and extreme high leverage ratios. Based on these results, we 
speculate  that delinquencies have  no  action  when there is a prospect of self-cure (low 
unemployment, high home prices, low LTV), or in cases in which lenders decide to wait 
potentially for the market to turn (high LTV). 
 
3.4.  Agency conflicts between servicers and lenders 
Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010) hypothesize that agency conflicts between servicers and 
investors  pose an important hurdle to  whether loans are liquidated or modified when they 
become delinquent. We test this proposition in our data, which has the advantage of enabling us 
                                                           
15 “No action” is the residual category; therefore, there is no new information in this panel. Nevertheless, we present 
it for expositional purposes in order to facilitate characterization of mortgages that enter the “no action” group. 16 
 
to identify modification directly from the servicers’ reports, rather than having to infer it from 
the prevalence of foreclosure resolutions or imputing it from observed changes in contract terms.  
The results in Table 3, Panel B show that loans owned by private investors are indeed 
less likely to become modified than portfolio loans with identical characteristics (Column (5)). 
The OLS coefficient estimate is -0.031, which is both statistically and economically significant 
given the unconditional six-month modification rates of less than 10 percent. This result supports 
the claim of Piskorski et al. (2010) that securitization is hampering modification due to legal 
complications. In a similar flavor to this  result, we find that loans which are second lien 
(piggybacks) are less likely to become modified. Again, the magnitude is large: -0.113. We 
attribute this result to the conflict of interest between lenders.  
We find also lower likelihood of modification for loans securitized by the GSEs, with an 
even greater negative coefficient (-0.066). This result may appear surprising at first given the 
government pressure towards modifications. We propose several explanations. First, the 
precarious financial position of the GSEs in 2008 prior to their conservatorship may have made it 
difficult for them to engage in modifications and the attendant loss recognition. Second,  it 
appears that GSEs favor refinancing as a resolution method that keeps the borrower in the house. 
Table 3, Panel B, Column (2) shows that securitization of a loan by a GSE increases the 
likelihood of its being refinanced by 3.5 percentage points. 
 
3.5.  Strategic behavior by lenders 
A few studies hypothesize that the rate of modification is low because lenders do not 
realize the entire adverse effect from foreclosures and thus liquidate in areas in which they do not 
suffer the externalities of liquidation (Frame 2010). We can test this by evaluating whether the 
servicer’s behavior differs if they are more ‘invested’ in the local market. If so, they may be 
more apt to be affected by the adverse externalities resulting from local foreclosures. To test this 
hypothesis, we compute the log of the total unpaid balance held by the servicer in the local 
market—defined as the zip code. The hypothesis is that the servicer is more likely to internalize 
the losses due to liquidation in areas in which their stakes are higher. However, the results do not 17 
 
show support for this hypothesis, as they fail to pick up the effect of this variable on any of the 
resolution choices.  
 
3.6.  Is servicer heterogeneity explained by borrower and loan characteristics? 
Regressions in Table 3 include a long list of covariates that capture a number of key 
observable characteristics of borrowers and loans, as well as some macroeconomic factors. The 
simplest way to test whether differences across servicers are explained by those characteristics is 
to compare the goodness of fit achieved in specifications that incorporate servicing entity fixed 
effects and those that exclude them. This comparison is shown on the bottom two rows of Panels 
A and B. For each individual resolution choice—liquidation, foreclosure initiation, repayment, 
modification, or refinance—we observe a considerable improvement in fit after the addition of 
servicer fixed effects. The improvement in adjusted R
2 is much more muted for the aggregate 
categories, as can be expected from the effects of the adding-up constraint on resolution choices. 
We interpret these  results  as evidence of  diverse  servicer-specific approaches to loss 
mitigation during the early part (2008) of the unprecedented volume of troubled loans. These 
differences cannot be explained by variation in the borrower population or the mix of loans at the 
servicing entity level. To a certain degree, these differences likely reflect the absence of an 
established uniform solution to loss mitigation. They may also reflect differences in servicer 
valuation models, their exposure to loss mitigation practices of the GSEs, history of mergers and 
acquisitions, etc. In the following section, we focus on differences in servicer approaches circa 
2008 to a particular loss mitigation practice—loan modification—that was standardized in the 
Treasury’s HAMP program in the early 2009. In particular, we will focus on the relationship 
between differences in modification terms and the subsequent performance of modified loans.  
 
4.   Modification terms and their effect on the likelihood of redefault  
4.1.  Servicer choices of loan modification terms 
Evidence  presented earlier highlighted considerable variation in resolution practices 
across servicers (see, for example, Figure 2). There also exists a similar degree of heterogeneity 18 
 
in  terms offered to borrowers  within a particular class of loss mitigation resolution—loan 
modifications. This variation is summarized graphically in Figure 4. The figure presents the 
relative frequency of major types of modified loan terms within each servicing entity. These 
types include interest rate reductions or freezes, principal writedowns or deferrals, capitalization 
of arrears,  and  extensions  of loan term.  Most loan modifications combine several of these 
changes; for example, and extension in the loan term could be accompanied by a reduction in the 
interest rate and capitalization of arrears into the principal. 
The pattern in Figure 4 is hardly surprising. Prior to the crisis, mortgage servicing was a 
relatively low margin, technology driven, commodity business. Although modifications did 
occurr, there were relatively few workout specialists on the payroll. When the crisis started, there 
was no central guidance like that provided by the HAMP, and limited information on what 
modification approaches could be more effective. Hence, some servicers preferred to capitalize 
unpaid interest into the loan balance (e.g., #12 and #14). Others favored rate reductions (e.g., #2 
and #9). Yet others (#7 and #15) preferred to combine rate reductions with extensions in loan 
repayment periods. A few (#4 and #7) incorporated principal writedowns into their menu of loan 
term modifications.  
Servicers differ not only in the terms they chose to modify, but also in the extent of 
modifications offered to distressed borrowers. Figure 5 provides some evidence in this regard. 
For loans that became troubled in the first quarter of 2008, the average reduction in interest rate 
spanned an enormous range between 0 and more than 350 basis points. Although much of the 
dispersion is accounted for by three outliers, its magnitude is all the more surprising since it 
refers to servicer averages. Figure 5 also shows convergence to a narrower band of rate changes 
by the second quarter of 2009. This is suggestive of learning that may have occurred in the 
industry following the onset of the financial crisis. Figure 6 shows the same convergence pattern 
across types of owners (or securitizers) of troubled loans. The tentative reduction over time in the 
magnitude of modified terms requires a more thorough analysis, which we defer to future work.  
The analysis in Table 4 explores how modification terms vary with borrowers’ FICO 
score  when in trouble, LTV  when in trouble, and lender and servicer identities.  The set of 
regression covariates is the same as in Table 3. The dependent variables presented in Table 4 
include changes in the monthly mortgage payment (measured in percentage point terms), in the 19 
 
mortgage interest rate (basis points), in the mortgage principal balance (percent change), and in 
the mortgage term (months). The  results  in general show  some  systematic variation in 
modification terms with observable covariates. Since the reduction in the monthly payment is an 
amalgam of all other changes, we concentrate on it first. Although loan payments decrease less 
for investment loans conditional on modification (a positive coefficient partially offsets a 
negative unconditional mean), their decline is greater for low documentation loans. Low LTV 
loans (graph not shown) on average experience smaller changes in payment. This is again 
consistent with expectations of greater self-cure rates requiring smaller lender concessions. The 
coefficients on GSE and private-label securitized loans in Column (3) confirm the results in 
Figure 6 in a multivariate setting. Namely, relative to portfolio-held loans, loans securitized by 
the GSEs receive smaller reductions in interest rates upon modification, while those securitized 
by third parties receive greater interest rate reductions.  
While there is no evidence of correlation between FICO buckets and changes in the 
monthly payment and mortgage terms (also not shown), the picture is a bit clearer for interest 
rate and balance changes. Figure 7 presents plots of the dummies for Columns (2) and (3) of 
Table 4. Both higher FICO groups and lower LTV groups receive smaller reductions in interest 
rates.  This evidence suggests that servicers provide greater term improvements for weaker 
borrowers.  
We further find that the identity of servicing entities is an important determinant of 
modification terms. For each of the four types of  changes reported in Table 4, there is a 
substantial increase in adjusted R
2 associated with the inclusion of servicer fixed effects. In each 
case, servicer fixed effects raise the adjusted-R
2 by about 50 percent. 
 
4.2.  Redefault following modification 
In this subsection we exploit substantial differences in the modification terms and the 
unobserved servicer characteristics to assess the relationship between the magnitude of such 
changes and post modification loan performance. 
Redefault rates following loan  modification have  been very high during our  sample 
period. Table 1, Panel F, shows that redefault rates (defined as 60+ dpd within six months) vary 20 
 
between 30% and 46% for the 2008 vintage.
16
Redefault rates also vary by the type of loan modification. In Panel G of Table 1, we 
present the redefault rate by modification type. The panel shows that capitalization of arrears and 
interest rate reductions are associated with the highest redefault rates. Curiously, freezing rather 
than reducing interest rates is associated with a lower -redefault rate. This evidence reinforces 
the point we made earlier: modification terms are endogenous and tailored to the borrower.  
 A more restrictive definition of redefault (90+ dpd 
within six months) has lower rates, but still very high in absolute levels: 20% to 30% for the 
2008 vintage. 
We also note the wide variation in redefault rates across servicers, presented in Panel E of 
Table 1. This variation may result from different decision rules for offering modification 
programs, differences  in  modification terms, and differences in the troubled population. 
Consequently, we need to control for observable borrower characteristics as well as servicer-
specific effects in analyzing redefault rates. 
We study the determinants of redefault within six months since modification in a 
multivariate regression framework in Table 5. At the outset, in column (1) we focus on the effect 
of borrower and loan characteristics at the time of modification on redefault. Subsequent 
columns (2-5), explicitly evaluate the effect of modification terms.  In all specifications, the 
dependent variable is a default indicator multiplied by 100.  
The results in column (1) show higher redefault rates by for low documentation loans. 
Somewhat surprisingly, we also find a strong positive effect of past home price increases in a 
geographic area on redefault rates. The same holds for loans serviced by servicers who modified 
many loans in the same zipcode. High past appreciation makes loans less likely to be underwater, 
and it is possible that servicers rushed to modify loans in such areas first.  
Figure 8 presents the coefficients on the FICO, LTV, and year dummies associated with 
column (1). The figure shows that redefault almost monotonically decreases with FICO, and 
increases with LTV and the origination year. When comparing the magnitude of the effect of 
                                                           
16 Our redefault figures somewhat differ from the OCC and OTS (2009) reports although the average level is similar. 
The average redefault rate in the OCC and OTS report from the second quarter of 2009 is 42%, while ours is 40.6%. 
One potential reason for the difference is that we require borrowers to be current on the last quarter of 2007, while 
the OCC and OTS reports do not have such a requirement. 21 
 
FICO scores and LTV, it appears that FICO has a stronger effect. By estimating the average 
slope on the charts we can assess the economic magnitude of the variables. On average, one 
standard deviation change in FICO scores (77.3) maps into a change of 2.5% points in redefault 
rate (0.1 standard deviations). One standard deviation change in LTV (24.7%) translates to about 
1.0% points in redefault rate (0.04 standard deviations). Further, there is a strong effect of the 
year of origination on the likelihood of redefault. Loans that were originated in 2006 (2007, 
2008-2009) are more likely to redefault by 6% points (8% points, 12.4%). 
 
4.3.  Measuring of the Effects of Modification Terms on Redefault 
Since reducing loan redefault rates following modification is a prime objective of lenders, 
investors, and policymakers, it is important to understand the relationship between the terms of 
modification and the likelihood of redefault. The likelihood of redefault partially depends on 
reasons for borrower default. For example, one argument is that borrowers redefault because of 
affordability, i.e., they do not have the cash flow to afford the modified loan. Another argument 
is that the redefaults actually are based on strategic behavior resulting from the borrower’s 
realization that the loan is underwater and an unattractive long-term investment.
17
Federal policy regarding modifications appears to have taken a stand in this debate. In 
2009, the Administration introduced the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), at 
the center of which is a series of incentives for lenders and servicers to modify loans to increase 
mortgage affordability. Hence, the question of whether affordability is significantly important in 
reducing redefault is of paramount importance in determining current housing policy. 
 Efforts to keep 
the owner in the house may differ under the two alternatives and may suggest a preference by 
lenders to forgive principal rather than adjust the mortgage terms to increase affordability. 
The natural test to evaluate the importance of affordability is to regress an indicator of 
redefault on changes in monthly payment or changes in the interest rate along with the other 
controls utilized in Tables 3 and 4. Since modification terms are not determined randomly, but 
rather may reflect some unobserved borrower and loan characteristics, such regression estimates 
                                                           
17 Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) provide evidence on the relative importance of these factors in the context of 
mortgage defaults during the early 1990’s.   22 
 
may be biased. As mentioned in Footnote 5, we considered a number of instrumental variable 
specifications to address this concern. The current version of the paper, however, focuses on 
describing an associative relationship between modification terms and redefault.  We note, 
however, that since modification terms are generally more favorable towards weaker borrowers, 
as has been shown in Section 4.1, the bias is likely to go against finding a positive correlation 
between redefault rate and improvements in borrower affordability and loan balance terms. 
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 5, where redefault is measured as 60+ 
days past due within 6 months after modification.  Although we have about 220,000 loan 
modifications in the overall sample, the regressions are estimated on a much smaller subset of 
observations. Part of the attrition is due to exclusion of loans that enter modification programs in 
2009, since their outcomes are censored. Another part is due to incomplete reporting of 
modification terms and time-of-default loan characteristics. 
Column (2) presents the results for change in the monthly mortgage payment. We find a 
very  strong positive relationship between the magnitude of payment reductions and lower 
subsequent redefault rates. In particular, a coefficient of 0.284 implies that a 15 percent reduction 
in a monthly payment (the average in the sample of modified loans) is associated with redefault 
rates that are about 4.5% percent lower. Since the baseline rates of redefault hover around 40%, 
this decline is economically sizable.  
Among other covariates, we find a monotone relationship between redefault rates and 
borrower  FICO scores and LTV ratios at the time of sample entry. As expected, redefaults 
decline with FICO scores and rise with LTV ratios. Redefault rates are also higher among loans 
originally underwritten with less than full documentation, and are marginally higher for investor 
loans.  
Column (3) shows the results for the most common element of loan modifications—the 
change in the loan interest rate. Once again, the result is strongly statistically significant and 
economically important. A reduction of 200 basis points (about the sample average) implies an 8 
percentage point reduction in the likelihood of redefault. Columns (4) and (5) fail to pick up a 
significant association between redefaults and principal balance reductions and loan term 23 
 
extensions. Given the relative paucity of these modification approaches, the lack of statistical 
power is not surprising.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
  In this paper,  we study the loss mitigation practices used by mortgage servicers and 
lenders prior to the increased role of government intervention through the HAMP. Our results 
show that the majority of loans in trouble end up in liquidation, although the importance of 
liquidation has diminished somewhat over time. We also find that securitized loans are less 
likely to be modified, consistent with the idea that agency conflicts inhibit aggressive corrective 
actions. In addition, we document that there is wide variation in the loss mitigation practices of 
servicers and that this variation converged somewhat over time, possibly due to learning. 
  An important policy issue is determining the effect of modification terms on redefault 
rates. We find a statistically significant and economically sizable association between greater 
reductions in monthly payments and/or loan interest rates and subsequent redefault. These results 
are consistent with the driving idea behind the Home Affordable Modifications Program 
(HAMP). In this program,  servicers and lenders are incentivized to increase mortgage 
affordability  as much as possible.  However, this advantages of this program need to be 
contrasted with the cost to investors (or lenders) resulting from the lower payment. We leave the 
study of the effectiveness of the HAMP for future research. 24 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
The  table presents descriptive statistics of the sample studied. The base sample is the universe of 
residential mortgages serviced by the largest 19 banks in the U.S. The subsample that we study here 
contains observations of mortgages that became 60+ days past  due (dpd) or entered loss mitigation 
programs (collectively called “loans in trouble”) between January 2008 and May 2009. Panel A presents 
descriptive summary statistics of loans in trouble as well as of the subset that were modified. Panel B lists 
the number of loans that were first in trouble, per calendar quarter. Panel C presents a breakdown of the 
reasons for default for loans that entered the loss mitigation process. Panel D presents a breakdown of the 
delinquency status of loans that enter the loss mitigation process. Panel E presents means of LTV and 
FICO per servicer at the time of origination. Panel F presents a breakdown of resolutions and redefault 
rates per servicer. Panel G presents redefault (within 6 months) rates of modified loans per calendar 
quarter. Panel H shows that a breakdown of the modification types per calendar quarter. 
 













Variable N Mean Std Dev Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Resolution: Repayment 6 months 1766209 0.0258 0.1585 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Resolution: Modification 6 months 1766209 0.0941 0.2919 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Resolution: Refinance within 6 months 1766209 0.0185 0.1348 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Resolution: Liquidation within 6 months 1766209 0.2643 0.4410 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
FICO at origination 1500559 658.9097 66.5949 300 617 661 706 850
FICO at "in trouble" 1467238 599.4463 89.2020 335 528 590 667 850
LTV at origination 1491279 81.6321 14.4214 30.0000 75.0000 80.0000 91.4900 156.5000
LTV at "in trouble" 1126936 85.8682 23.9206 30.0000 73.4140 81.4000 97.0000 199.9993
Securitizer is GSE 1766209 0.3364 0.4725 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Securitizer is private 1766209 0.2564 0.4366 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
log(sum(unpaid balance per lender-zip code)) 1766209 11.2750 8.6041 0.0000 0.0000 16.7964 18.3423 21.1100
Share of servicer's modified loans in zipcode 1766209 0.0620 0.1767 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Change in unemployment 1766209 0.2277 0.4053 -4.3000 0.1000 0.2609 0.4000 8.1000
Change in home prices since origination 1766209 -0.0126 0.2319 -0.5912 -0.1320 -0.0134 0.0283 2.8599
Borrower is non-occupier 1762806 0.1568 0.3636 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Second lien 1766207 0.0956 0.2940 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Low doc mortgage 1766209 0.0471 0.2118 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Stated income mortgage 1766209 0.2181 0.4130 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Mortgage is ARM 1755818 0.3613 0.4804 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.000027 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Cont.) 
Panel A: Summary Statistics (Cont.) 
 
 
Panel B: Breakdown of the Number of Loans in Trouble, per Calendar Quarter 
 
 
Panel C: Breakdown of Reasons of Default 
 
 
   
Modified loans:
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min p25 p50 p75 Max
FICO at "in trouble" 188283 572.8638 77.3266 343 514 561 629 837
LTV pre-modification 138749 91.4427 24.6815 30.0000 78.0000 88.0000 100.0000 199.6400
LTV post-modification 130422 90.4192 24.2434 30.0000 78.0000 88.0000 100.0000 171.0000
Modification: Principal deferred 220496 0.0312 0.1739 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Modification: Principal write-down 220496 0.0252 0.1568 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Modification: Interest capitalized 220496 0.4843 0.4998 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Modification: Interest rate reduced 220496 0.6701 0.4702 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Modification: Interest rate frozen 220496 0.3277 0.4694 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Modification: Term extended 220496 0.2969 0.4569 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Modification: Combination 220496 0.7053 0.4559 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Change in payment (%) 69460 -15.1356 21.0665 -76.9850 -30.2535 -14.5938 0.0000 50.0000
Change interest rates (bps) 217564 -172.2595 210.7178 -1120.0000 -300.0000 -100.0000 0.0000 510.0000
Change in balance (%) 220400 1.0088 2.3832 -1.6482 0.0000 0.0000 0.2416 15.0000
Change in term (months) 175864 2.3254 16.8552 -110.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 120.0000
Change in unemployment (%) 220115 0.4047 0.5547 -0.0150 0.0000 0.0210 1.1879 1.1879
Change in home prices since origination (%) 220496 0.0324 0.0553 -0.0920 0.0000 0.0332 0.0332 0.6926
Redefault (60+ dpd) within 6 months (0/1) × 100 220496 34.3226 47.4787 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 100.0000
# Borrowers
Quarter in trouble
2008Q1 309,356        
2008Q2 322,498        
2008Q3 287,799        
2008Q4 341,935        
2009Q1 238,475        
2009Q2 266,146        
Total 1,766,209     









Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Cont.) 
 
Panel D: Mean LTV and FICO at Origination, by Servicer Entity 
 
 
   



















19 85.9 673.829 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Cont.) 
 
Panel E: Resolution and Rates of Redefault within 6 Months, by Servicer Entity 
 
 
Panel F: Rates of Modification Redefault within 6 Months, by Modification Quarter 
 
 
Panel G: Rates of Redefault within 6 Months, by Modification Type 
 
 
Servicer entity No Resolution Foreclosure process Liquidation All Trial Permanent Repayment Refinance 60+ dpd 90+ dpd
1 18.8% 2.1% 16.6% 59.7% 2.1% 59.5% 0.0% 0.5% 16.7% 9.4%
2 57.9% 19.6% 6.9% 7.8% 0.0% 7.8% 0.0% 7.8% 48.5% 31.3%
3 25.3% 39.1% 30.2% 4.2% 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 1.2% 21.1% 21.1%
4 47.2% 26.0% 11.4% 2.8% 0.0% 1.4% 11.4% 2.2% 48.2% 32.7%
5 42.5% 20.9% 12.9% 16.7% 0.2% 16.2% 5.8% 1.4% 16.4% 12.4%
6 41.6% 35.8% 16.1% 4.0% 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 2.5% 36.7% 25.7%
7 58.5% 10.5% 0.5% 25.5% 0.0% 25.5% 2.3% 2.7% 30.3% 26.4%
8 43.0% 8.4% 22.0% 9.8% 0.0% 9.8% 0.0% 16.8% 17.6% 12.5%
9 56.6% 18.8% 4.0% 10.8% 0.0% 10.8% 0.0% 9.8% 55.0% 32.1%
10 64.1% 15.4% 13.5% 4.0% 0.2% 3.9% 0.6% 2.5% 39.5% 28.9%
11 50.0% 3.6% 1.5% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 2.5% 42.2% 60.6% 42.4%
12 62.9% 22.1% 5.9% 4.7% 0.1% 3.8% 0.0% 4.4% 44.1% 31.7%
13 34.7% 21.4% 17.6% 24.4% 0.4% 24.0% 0.2% 1.7% 32.4% 22.2%
14 43.9% 23.3% 9.3% 5.2% 2.7% 2.6% 16.3% 2.2% 45.7% 39.8%
15 63.2% 12.5% 7.0% 6.7% 0.0% 6.6% 9.0% 2.0% 26.2% 15.6%
16 34.6% 26.3% 16.6% 18.1% 0.0% 16.2% 2.6% 1.9% 50.5% 36.1%
17 56.9% 15.4% 7.2% 6.5% 0.0% 6.4% 11.4% 2.7% 33.7% 21.9%
18 55.4% 23.1% 6.9% 7.5% 0.0% 7.5% 0.0% 7.1% 47.7% 39.1%
19 54.3% 25.6% 9.3% 4.9% 0.0% 4.9% 0.0% 5.8% 0.0% 0.0%
Redefault
Resolution within 6 months
Modification Leave the house
Stay in the house
Modification quarter N % 60+ dpd % 90+ dpd
2008Q1 14,323      48.4% 23.4%
2008Q2 28,746      38.3% 27.6%
2008Q3 27,418      51.0% 36.0%
2008Q4 53,995      34.4% 21.7%
Total 124,482    40.6% 26.4%
Modification type 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4
Interest Rate Frozen 8.1% 24.5% 31.8% 31.2%
Interest Rate Reduction 24.9% 62.7% 54.0% 53.2%
Term Extended 6.2% 11.2% 23.4% 19.8%
Principal Deferred 0.3% 1.4% 6.5% 2.1%
Principal Writedown 0.0% 0.1% 1.3% 0.7%
Capitalization 15.1% 32.9% 46.5% 46.9%
Combination 30.1% 63.1% 65.8% 59.7%
Quarter30 
 
Table 2. Resolution outcomes within a given time frame, by quarter of entry into sample 
The table presents the resolutions (or no action) of borrowers who became “in trouble” in a particular 
calendar quarter. Panel A (B, C, D) present the outcomes within 3 (6, 9, 12) months. The base sample is 
the universe of residential mortgages serviced by the largest 19 banks in the U.S. The subsample that we 
study here contains observations of mortgages that became 60+ days past due (dpd) or entered loss 
mitigation programs (collectively called “loans in trouble”) between January 2008 and May 2009.  
 
Panel A: Resolutions within 3 months 
 
 
Panel B: Resolutions within 6 months 
 
   
Quarter: 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1
# Borrowers in trouble in cohort: 309,356      322,498      287,799      341,935      238,475     
In Forclosure process 14.6% 13.1% 11.6% 20.2% 23.9%
Liquidation 6.1% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.9%
Total "Leave the house" 20.7% 13.8% 12.1% 20.8% 24.8%
Repayment 1.5% 0.9% 1.1% 1.9% 3.7%
Modification 6.9% 6.4% 4.9% 9.7% 9.2%
Refinance 1.3% 1.3% 1.1% 1.2% 1.7%
Total "Stay in the house" 9.7% 8.6% 7.1% 12.8% 14.7%
No action 69.6% 77.7% 80.8% 66.4% 60.5%
Quarter: 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 Total 2008
# Borrowers in trouble in cohort: 309,356      322,498      287,799      341,935      1,261,588  
In Forclosure process 16.4% 19.5% 23.9% 28.4% 22.2%
Liquidation 16.1% 9.1% 5.0% 3.8% 8.4%
Total "Leave the house" 32.5% 28.6% 28.9% 32.2% 30.6%
Repayment 2.0% 1.8% 2.6% 3.2% 2.4%
Modification 9.4% 9.7% 9.4% 12.7% 10.4%
Refinance 2.1% 2.5% 1.8% 2.2% 2.2%
Total "Stay in the house" 13.5% 14.0% 13.8% 18.1% 15.0%
No action 54.0% 57.4% 57.3% 49.7% 54.4%31 
 
Table 2. Resolution outcomes within a given time frame (Cont.) 
 
Panel C: Resolutions within 9 months 
 
 
Panel D: Resolutions within 12 months 
 
   
Quarter: 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3
# Borrowers in trouble in cohort: 309,356      322,498      287,799     
In Forclosure process 17.7% 23.0% 30.1%
Liquidation 26.7% 17.3% 10.4%
Total "Leave the house" 44.3% 40.3% 40.5%
Repayment 2.9% 2.8% 4.1%
Modification 12.1% 13.5% 12.5%
Refinance 2.8% 3.2% 3.2%
Total "Stay in the house" 17.8% 19.5% 19.9%
No action 37.8% 40.2% 39.7%
Quarter: 2008Q1 2008Q2
# Borrowers in trouble in cohort: 309,356      322,498     
In Forclosure process 18.8% 25.8%
Liquidation 34.8% 22.0%




Total "Stay in the house" 21.6% 23.8%
No action 24.9% 28.5%32 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Loss Mitigation Resolution 
The  table presents regressions of resolution type indicators on borrower, contract, and servicer 
information. The base sample is the universe of residential mortgages serviced by the largest 19 banks in 
the U.S. The subsample that we study contains observations of mortgages that became 60+ days past due 
(dpd) or entered loss mitigation programs (collectively called “loans in trouble”) between January 2008 
and May 2009. Panel A presents regressions of resolutions in which the borrower leaves the house. Panel 
B  presents regressions of resolutions in which the borrower stays in the house. Panel B  presents 
regressions of no action. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
servicer entity level. *, **, *** denote two-tailed  significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Likelihood of resolutions that result in the borrower leaving the house 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Securitizer is GSE -0.003 -0.004 0.002
(-0.092) (-0.238) (0.100)
Securitizer is private -0.001 -0.038 0.037
(-0.037) (-0.609) (0.976)
Second lien 0.107 0.104 0.125* 0.130* -0.018 -0.026
(1.265) (1.261) (1.840) (1.895) (-0.395) (-0.618)
Borrower is non-occupier 0.082*** 0.085*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.055*** 0.051***
(5.437) (5.259) (4.003) (5.128) (6.014) (4.547)
Low doc mortgage 0.032 0.035 0.022 0.017 0.010 0.018
(1.676) (1.658) (1.458) (1.090) (0.772) (1.694)
Stated income mortgage 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.013* 0.014** 0.038** 0.042***
(5.931) (6.465) (1.950) (2.503) (2.933) (3.473)
Mortgage is ARM 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.031** 0.029** 0.050*** 0.055***
(5.092) (5.413) (2.692) (2.299) (5.923) (6.295)
Change in unemployment 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.038* 0.046** 0.053** 0.049**
(3.350) (3.429) (1.940) (2.394) (2.285) (2.164)
Change in home prices since origination -0.144*** -0.141*** -0.032* -0.030* -0.112*** -0.111***
(-4.907) (-4.808) (-2.058) (-2.041) (-3.309) (-3.187)
log(sum(unpaid balance per lender-zip code)) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(1.455) (1.436) (1.225) (0.867) (1.387) (1.539)
Share of servicer's modified loans in zipcode -0.019* -0.019* 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.028** -0.028**
(-1.895) (-1.858) (4.279) (5.152) (-2.580) (-2.651)
In trouble FICO score bucket FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
In trouble LTV bucket FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Servicer entity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Securitizer FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 834944 834944 834944 834944 834944 834944
Adj. R
2 0.149 0.155 0.151 0.184 0.190 0.197
Adj. R
2 without servicer entity FE 0.075 0.132 0.128
within 6 months (0/1)
"Leave the house"
within 6 months (0/1)
Liquidation Foreclosure initiation
within 6 months (0/1)33 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Loss Mitigation Resolution (Cont.) 
 
Panel B: Likelihood of resolutions that result in the borrower staying in the house 
 
  
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Securitizer is GSE -0.029 0.035* -0.066** 0.002
(-1.645) (2.136) (-2.688) (0.618)
Securitizer is private -0.024 0.010 -0.031** -0.002
(-1.383) (1.379) (-2.178) (-0.839)
Second lien -0.142*** -0.150*** -0.029 -0.030 -0.113*** -0.119*** -0.001 -0.002
(-5.161) (-5.517) (-1.481) (-1.758) (-3.150) (-3.520) (-0.482) (-0.634)
Borrower is non-occupier -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.011** -0.011** -0.042*** -0.044*** 0.002* 0.002
(-9.340) (-11.455) (-2.219) (-2.235) (-5.568) (-7.880) (1.832) (1.581)
Low doc mortgage -0.009 -0.017 0.024* 0.007 -0.029*** -0.021** -0.004 -0.003
(-0.682) (-1.549) (1.988) (1.296) (-3.208) (-2.259) (-1.420) (-0.897)
Stated income mortgage -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.003 -0.001 -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.008** -0.007**
(-4.252) (-3.554) (0.722) (-0.381) (-4.073) (-4.843) (-2.374) (-2.178)
Mortgage is ARM -0.083** -0.082** -0.007 -0.010 -0.080** -0.077* 0.004* 0.004*
(-2.447) (-2.442) (-0.971) (-1.287) (-2.189) (-2.079) (2.121) (2.110)
Change in unemployment 0.016 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.018 0.015 -0.003 -0.004
(0.783) (0.686) (0.192) (0.370) (0.833) (0.727) (-0.466) (-0.498)
Change in home prices since origination 0.029 0.028 0.018* 0.017* -0.007 -0.007 0.018 0.018
(1.585) (1.522) (1.938) (1.919) (-0.487) (-0.468) (1.087) (1.076)
log(sum(unpaid balance per lender-zip code)) -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.618) (-1.563) (-1.417) (-2.088) (-0.269) (0.151) (-1.746) (-1.741)
Share of servicer's modified loans in zipcode 0.017 0.017 0.007 0.006 0.010* 0.010* 0.000 0.000
(1.340) (1.335) (1.043) (0.991) (2.118) (2.083) (0.023) (0.044)
In trouble FICO score bucket FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
In trouble LTV bucket FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Servicer entity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Securitizer FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 834944 834944 834944 834944 834944 834944 834944 834944
Adj. R
2 0.083 0.074 0.055 0.064 0.075 0.082 0.112 0.113
Adj. R
2 without servicer entity FE 0.047 0.030 0.031 0.017
within 6 months (0/1)
"Stay in the house" 
within 6 months (0/1)
Refinance Repayment  Modification
within 6 months (0/1) within 6 months (0/1)34 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Loss Mitigation Resolution (Cont.) 
 
Panel C: Likelihood of “No action” 
    
(1) (2)
Securitizer is GSE 0.031
(1.239)
Securitizer is private 0.025*
(1.920)
Second lien 0.035 0.045
(0.478) (0.650)
Borrower is non-occupier -0.031** -0.032*
(-2.169) (-1.931)
Low doc mortgage -0.023 -0.018
(-1.671) (-1.550)
Stated income mortgage -0.030** -0.034**
(-2.588) (-2.814)
Mortgage is ARM 0.003 -0.002
(0.101) (-0.065)
Change in unemployment -0.106*** -0.108***
(-4.847) (-4.659)
Change in home prices since origination 0.115** 0.113**
(2.611) (2.524)
log(sum(unpaid balance per lender-zip code)) -0.000 -0.000
(-0.552) (-0.651)
Share of servicer's modified loans in zipcode 0.002 0.002
(0.223) (0.308)
In trouble FICO score bucket FE Yes Yes
In trouble LTV bucket FE Yes Yes
Origination year FE Yes Yes
Calendar month FE Yes Yes
Servicer entity FE Yes Yes





2 without servicer entity FE 0.074
"No action" 
within 6 months (0/1)35 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Modification Terms 
The table presents regressions of modification terms on borrower, contract, and servicer information. The 
base sample is the universe of residential mortgages serviced by the largest 19 banks in the U.S. The 
subsample that we study contains observations of mortgages that became 60+ days past due (dpd) or 
entered loss mitigation programs (collectively called “loans in trouble”) between January 2008 and 
December 2008. The regressions in the table include only loans that were modified and which servicers 
report their modification terms. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Robust standard errors are 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Securitizer is GSE 1.459 67.662** 0.665*** 0.490*
(0.544) (2.497) (5.976) (1.782)
Securitizer is private -1.458*** -53.518*** 0.131* 0.603**
(-8.082) (-9.068) (1.874) (2.233)
Second lien -4.766 -4.731 -16.292 -15.248 0.006 0.015 0.057 0.047
(-0.681) (-0.683) (-0.289) (-0.271) (0.073) (0.239) (1.063) (1.003)
Borrower is non-occupier 1.647*** 1.604*** 6.551 6.533 0.040 0.045* 0.000 0.011
(4.563) (4.184) (1.038) (1.028) (1.584) (1.829) (0.003) (0.493)
Low doc mortgage -5.194*** -5.250*** -11.983 -12.549 -0.028 -0.085*** -0.104** -0.072*
(-15.596) (-12.444) (-0.572) (-0.610) (-0.347) (-3.321) (-2.531) (-1.955)
Stated income mortgage -0.945 -0.955 -13.960 -14.437 0.054 0.046 -0.174** -0.144*
(-0.844) (-0.826) (-0.648) (-0.663) (1.589) (1.087) (-2.356) (-1.839)
Mortgage is ARM -3.353 -3.359 6.463 7.256 -0.112 -0.115 0.019 0.040
(-1.552) (-1.555) (0.146) (0.163) (-0.809) (-0.902) (0.447) (0.958)
Change in unemployment (%) -0.129 -0.179 -5.707** -6.101** -0.092 -0.087 -0.062 -0.055
(-0.175) (-0.253) (-2.790) (-2.758) (-1.643) (-1.569) (-0.962) (-0.897)
Change in home prices since origination (%) 0.261 0.254 -12.035 -14.108 0.841 0.777 -1.500*** -1.294***
(0.108) (0.123) (-0.222) (-0.260) (0.921) (0.895) (-6.932) (-6.852)
log(sum(unpaid balance per lender-zip code)) 0.002 -0.004 -0.046 -0.054 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004* -0.003*
(0.026) (-0.064) (-0.208) (-0.247) (-1.675) (-1.705) (-1.871) (-1.831)
Share of servicer's modified loans in zipcode 1.198*** 1.177*** 1.911 1.900 0.052 0.051 -0.075** -0.081**
(3.297) (3.441) (1.215) (1.174) (1.137) (1.117) (-2.184) (-2.401)
In trouble FICO score bucket FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
In trouble LTV bucket FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Servicer entity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Securitizer FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 14337 14337 62808 62808 63166 63166 47352 47352
Adj. R
2 0.228 0.229 0.314 0.315 0.199 0.204 0.059 0.066
Adj. R
2 without servicer entity FE 0.150 0.222 0.138 0.026
Change in …
payment (%) interest rates (bps) balance (%) term (months)36 
 
Table 5. Redefault following Modification 
The table presents regressions of redefault indicator (becoming 60+ dpd within 6 months) on modification 
terms, in addition to borrower, contract, and servicer information. The base sample is the universe of 
residential mortgages serviced by the largest 19 banks in the U.S. The subsample that we study contains 
observations of mortgages that became 60+ days past due (dpd) or entered loss mitigation programs 
(collectively called “loans in trouble”) between January 2008 and December 2008. t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. Robust standard errors are clustered by servicer entity level. *, **, *** denote 
two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in payment (%) 0.284***
(10.029)
Change in rate (bps) 0.039***
(9.047)
Change in balance (%) 0.062
(0.145)
Change in term (months) 1.328
(1.287)
Securitizer is GSE 1.851 -1.311 -1.259 1.434 2.990
(0.623) (-0.352) (-0.550) (0.432) (0.815)
Securitizer is private 0.304 1.425 1.907 -0.144 1.543
(0.166) (0.755) (0.877) (-0.070) (0.548)
Second lien 0.825 0.046 1.399 0.897 0.255
(0.594) (0.019) (0.700) (0.540) (0.090)
Borrower is non-occupier 2.353 2.821*** 1.597 1.838 1.784
(1.653) (4.919) (1.469) (1.547) (1.332)
Low doc mortgage 2.472** 2.597** 4.115*** 3.416*** 3.232***
(2.875) (2.683) (3.403) (3.530) (3.691)
Stated income mortgage -0.121 -0.250 0.652 0.062 -0.681
(-0.183) (-0.198) (0.585) (0.078) (-0.857)
Mortgage is ARM 8.520 6.481** 8.502* 8.792 9.429
(1.590) (2.888) (2.035) (1.631) (1.428)
Change in unemployment (%) -1.411 -1.212 -1.103 -1.358 -2.477***
(-1.435) (-0.793) (-1.331) (-1.513) (-3.136)
Change in home prices since origination (%) 27.334** 23.402** 30.289** 29.867** 17.638
(2.322) (2.371) (2.597) (2.331) (0.965)
log(sum(unpaid balance per lender-zip code)) -0.067 -0.100 -0.045 -0.048 -0.146**
(-0.825) (-0.968) (-0.619) (-0.712) (-2.145)
Share of servicer's modified loans in zipcode 1.880** 3.431*** 1.869** 1.967** 1.519
(2.183) (4.594) (2.233) (2.292) (1.488)
In trouble FICO score bucket FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
In trouble LTV bucket FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origination year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Servicer entity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 63174 14337 62806 63164 63164
Adj R
2 0.121 0.110 0.135 0.116 0.116
Adj. R
2 without servicer entity FE 0.073 0.082 0.096 0.067 0.075
Redefault (60+ dpd) within 6 months (0/1) × 10037 
 
Figure 1. Loss Mitigation Resolutions 
Initial Performance Status:
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Figure 3. FICO and LTV Bucket Coefficients in Resolution Choice Regressions 
A.  “Stay-in-the-house” resolutions 
 
 


















































































































































































































































































Figure 3. FICO and LTV Bucket Coefficients in Resolution Choice Regressions (Cont.) 
C.   “No action” 
 
 




The  chart shows the fraction of modified mortgages in which servicer entities applied a specific 
modification method. 





















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Servicing Entitity ID
Modification Type by Servicing Entity
(Non-mutually exclusive)
Rate Frozen Rate Reduction Term Extension Principal Deferred
Principal Writedown Capitalization Combination41 
 




The chart shows the average change in interest rates for modified loans, per calendar quarter of entrance 
into the troubled loan sample, by servicer entity. 
 




The chart shows the average change in interest rates for modified loans, per calendar quarter of entrance 
into the troubled loan sample, by type of investor/securitizer. 



























Change in Interest Rate 
by Modification Vintgage and Servicing Entity
1 3 5 6
7 10 12 13

























Change in Interest Rate 
by Modification Vintgage and  Seruritizer Type
FNMA FNMA
Private Securitizer Bank Portfolio
Unidentifiable Average42 
 




The charts show the sensitivity of the change in modification terms (from Table 4, Columns (2) and (3)) 
to FICO and LTV group dummies. The omitted group for FICO group dummies is (6). The omitted group 
for LTV group dummies is (5). Group dummy buckets are listed in Footnote (12). The solid line shows 
that point estimate and the dashed lines present two standard errors around the point estimate. 
































































































Change in balance (%)43 
 
Figure 8. Determinants of Redefault 
 
The charts show the sensitivity of redefault (from Table 5, Column (1)) to FICO, LTV and origination 
year group dummies. The omitted group for FICO group dummies is (6). The omitted group for LTV 
group dummies is (5). The omitted group for origination year dummies is (2). Group dummy buckets are 
listed in Footnotes (12) and (13). The solid line shows that point estimate and the dashed lines present two 
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